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Introduction 
 
Transformation to post-Fordism, intensified globalization and volatile markets together with 
growing individualization, consumerism and disengagement from political parties are among the 
many factors that have helped complicate the life of the union movement in different countries. For 
those who see this as an outcome of ideological battles, the neo-liberal turn since the 1980s really 
had compelling effects. Unions are in decline both in terms of membership and in terms of political 
power, seemingly unable to set the agenda in corporatist discourses and increasingly unable to 
formulate the interests of the mass as it transformed to a “multitude” (Hardt and Negri, 2000). The 
paradox seems to be that all the mentioned transformations might only lead to desirable outcomes if 
a strong union movement is able to “civilize” globalization and the new form of managerialism that 
is involved in these transformations. Current union weaknesses, then, is evoking pessimism over 
general capitalist evolution by a large group of Industrial Relations analysts. 
 
Against this pessimistic view, our aim is to point out in more detail how unions may define a new 
role for themselves. By taking on this new role, unions could become active co-constructors of the 
emerging society and, not least, gradually learn to exert a civilizing influence on globalization. 
 
Our argument runs as follows. By carefully studying the experimental evolution of firm level 
partnerships between management and union-representatives, in particular in subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations, it is possible to induce a number of novel roles, which unions could 
cultivate and potentially use to reform their position in western societies. The evolution of such 
local partnerships seems to take departure in reforms of the workplace and the re-organization at 
firm levels that propels towards finding new ways of making use of local labor markets and 
suppliers, becomes directed towards the reform of corporate governance of (multinational) 
corporations and is, finally, begging unions and employers associations to take on new roles 
supportive of the continuous experimentation with these extended local partnerships. Investigating 
the problems and challenges actors meet in making these evolutionary steps at local levels, a 
number of pressing needs of these partnerships is revealed and which we use to identify, what new 
roles unions and employers associations could develop. These roles are then considered and 
assessed in the light of and from their impacts on general union power in terms political and 
corporatist influence, and of membership representation. Finally we will suggest what are the 
characteristics of the Industrial Relations Regime (IRR) that evolves if unions and employers’ 
associations take on these new roles. 
 
Our study has been carried out in the distinct national context of the Danish Business and Industrial 
Relations System (Diverse fra Kristensen og Due, Madsen, etc), has focused on the games 
subsidiaries can play within the frame of multinational corporations (MNCs) (Kristensen and 
Zeitlin, 2005; Rocha, 2003), and on how shop stewards and convenors1 can act to influence these 
games (Kristensen, 2003). It is furthermore rooted in an ongoing project, studying how workplace 
re-organization may take different forms, effect various organizational problems, the resolution to 
which will highly influence the community of interests that either divides or unifies employees – 
and for that matter managers and employees (Lotz and Kristensen, 2005). How these reforms are 
tackled highly dependents on the national context in which they are implemented. It is our argument 
that it is exactly in societies with strong union representation – as in the Danish case – that new 
offensive roles of unions can be studied and be used to inspire union reforms in other countries. 
 
 
Positioning our Contribution 
 
Debates on union reforms have been intensive over the last decade2. Though our contribution can 
easily be placed within one of the various positions of this debate, it simultaneously relates to other 
positions in complicated ways. We share with Hyman (1999: 99) the belief that what is in crisis is a 
particular model of trade unionism (related to Fordism and Keynesianism), and when and if that 
particular model manages to give birth to a new model, the crisis may be overcome. However, 
models do not transform without human agency. The whole problem of “union revitalization and –
strategies” (Frege and Kelly, 2003, 2004; Baccaro et al 2003) and its distinct institutional 
foundations in distinct societies moves to the forefront, not least pointing out that courses of action 
and strategy will differ depending on how social and economic change effect distinct societies, their 
institutional context (particularly the Industrial Relations System), union structure, how other actors 
(state and employers) strategize and how unions frame this process and search for a new identity 
(Frege and Kelly, 2003:13). Within this framework, a new “wave of labor scholarship” has emerged 
                                                 
1 In Danish companies, also foreign owned, workers elect within each union a number of shop stewards, which in turn 
elect a convenor that speak on behalf of all workers. 
2 This debate has been elegantly summarized by Heery, 2003. 
that “examines the potential for unions to serve as proactive organizers and system builders, 
grappling with and shaping the challenges they face” (Baccaro et al. 2003: 127). This potential 
differs among societies, and it is clear that when focusing on Denmark, we are considering a 
situation much closer to Germany and Sweden (belonging to the so-called Coordinated Market 
Economies (CMEs) (Hall and Soskice,   )) than either to the USA and the UK (Liberal Market 
Economies, (LMEs)) or Italy and Spain (the Mediterranean model).  
 
In Denmark as in Germany, Unions’ position is highly institutionalized through bargaining 
institutions. Though unions corporatist position towards the state has weakened significantly, union 
representatives on lower levels have been able to increase intensity at others. Unions used to be 
highly involved in a “Ghent” system of unemployment insurance (Western, 1997), but lately this 
has been reformed, to reinforce decline in number of members and membership rates. Partly, blue-
collar unions fall victims to their own policies in continuous training, which tend to make members 
so socially mobile that they leave their original union. Consequently, Danish unions have pursued 
almost the entire repertoire of revitalization (acquisition of new members, mergers and internal re-
organization, action towards the political system, international links and partnerships with 
employers (Frege and Kelly, 2003, 2004)). However, it is obvious that so far unions have preferred 
a market- or society-oriented (Hyman,    ) strategy, where compromise with employers and the state 
is seen as the only best trajectory. This trajectory is one of social pacts, partnerships, etc., which in 
Denmark has been further emphasized by decentralizing collective agreements. 
 
The questions are: Does a new promising model for unions grow out of such a path, what does the 
new model look like, and what roles to unions to play?  
 
Industrial relations analysts do not agree that a strategy of social partnering is the right choice. Our 
position, however, follows essentially the adherents of the partnership thesis (Heery, 2003), which 
see the change to post-Fordism as benign to workers, if unions manage to develop a new role. If this 
becomes the case, unions may ensure workers improved employment relations in emerging high 
performance organizations (Osterman, 1999: 96), turn the new HRM practices into their advantage 
(Bacon and Storey, 1993) and may make the new types of firms work in such a way that profits 
become shared in various ways. In this vision distributive bargaining gives place for integrative 
bargaining (Thomas and Wallis 1998; Sisson and Marginsson, 2000) and we might move away 
from a system of centralized to one of coordinated bargaining (Sisson and Marginsson, 2000). 
 
This does not mean that we disagree with those that see the risk of degradation of work under post-
Fordism. But rather than fighting against this through a new form of union militancy, we believe 
unions are in a much better position provided that they are able to become competent negotiators 
that can contribute, in many ways, to the ongoing experimental process that is constructing our 
post-Fordist future. In our view this future is much less teleological given than was the combination 
of Fordism and Keynianism after WW2. An important dimension in constructing the new 
production regime is to create new types of work careers as bureaucratic hierarchies are broken up 
and routine-work becomes much less of a rule. We agree with Heery (1996) that unions must 
provide their members with tools for “navigating” in the new labor markets. However, rather than 
seeing this as an individualization project, we think the need is great for unions to institutionalize 
new career paths and especially to construct “rites of passage” for people in critical moments of life 
or for people in general disadvantaged positions. Renewal in this direction is less likely to come 
from leadership within unions, than from their rank and file, and not necessarily because union 
leadership is more conservative. However, neither union leaders nor their bureaucracies are highly 
informed of ongoing transformations and experiments in distinct localities, with the many novel 
forms of work organization being tested and with the highly various situations that individual 
members enters into or construct. Unions – organized as mass-movements and protecting 
standardized rights - can neither see the problems nor the chances that emerge with novel situations 
arising from the continuous experiments. This is why unions as organizations easily risk becoming 
only loosely coupled to ongoing transformations, which, on the other hand, play a focal role both 
for their members and especially for local activists, shop stewards, and convenors. And yet, the rank 
and file is in need of the union as a community in which they can think jointly, discuss and 
formulate their interests and positions towards this stream of novel situations arising with 
organizational and institutional experimentation. Otherwise, neither unions, members nor activists 
can actively deliberate on the direction of these experiments, which will be basically directed by 
managers and employers and dependent on their capacities for joint action. The big question then 
becomes: How can unions take on this new role that enables continuously the formation of new 
publics and provides the ranks and files with impulses and inspiration that make them active 
partners in shaping high performance organizations, often operating within multinational 
corporations? And how can they do this, while also trying to influence politics and institutionalize 
new forms of corporatism at state and European level? 
 
 
Partnership as Agency  
 
As it has been quite foundational for trade-unions as well as employers’ associations that their 
members could be counted as belonging to two opposing camps, the idea of adversaries was 
institutionalized at all levels of society in many Western countries. Essentially employers would 
only use alternative conceptualizations if they managed to create union-free shops, that is, if they 
could dominate the shop entirely. The advance in new forms of HRM, especially in the UK and the 
US, thus has been seen as ways of pressuring workers to collaborate from a weak position (Bacon, 
2003). Given this framing of firm level collaboration in the general debate, it is no wonder that 
unions in union-strong countries have been very skeptical, when their own members initiated such 
collaborative ties with managers even in cases where union density at the shop level was very high. 
In such cases, domination was not nearly as one sided. Rather it could and would be seen as mutual 
dependence between potential equals, which for the purpose of collaboration created a partnership – 
often in an informal way. Especially in MNC subsidiaries local managers are placed in a novel 
situation, where they might fight for the survival of the firm jointly with workers in the investment 
bargaining game that has become institutionalized by many a headquarters (HQ) (Mueller, 1996; 
Mueller and Purcell, 1992). However, also such partnerships build on employee and union strength 
place the unions in awkward positions. 
 
Thus partnerships between employees and employers have become an important topic in industrial 
relations (Ackers and Wilkinsson, 2003). Its potentials, pitfalls, advantages and implications for the 
different actors have been discussed intensely, not least in Britain and USA, where its potential for 
coping with loss of jobs to NICs  and to countries where economic actors have been involved in 
some kinds of partnership relations for a long time (e.g. German traditions for co-determination; 
Japanese forms of enterprise unions together with life long employment). 
 
Proponents of partnerships see a great potential as the partners can support each other in achieving 
more effectively their respective objectives, which may enable them to transform radically the 
organizational structure and division of labor of firms, by compelling people to think in new ways 
(Appelbaum et al. ,2000).  Teague (2005) argues that enterprise partnership may be seen as an 
exercise in deliberative democracy where the distinct actors are expected to collaborate inside a 
decision-making forum that allow for a gradual redefinition of identities and interests.  Therefore it 
is no wonder that Ackers and Payne (1998) argue that partnership combines seductive rhetoric with 
ambiguous and shifting meaning. Partnerships initiate processes of redefining identities and 
interests that will feedback to redefine the content and form of the partnership itself. This poses a 
great challenge to unions in particular, as their job as aggregators of interests on behalf of their 
membership becomes much more complex. Therefore it is interesting that Ackers and Payne are 
quite unambiguous when defending partnerships potentials for trade union revitalization. 
Partnership “offers British trade unions a strategy that is not only capable of moving with the times 
and accommodating new political developments, but, also allows them a hand in shaping their own 
destiny” (ibid:529).   
 
For managers in subsidiaries of MNCs the attraction of partnerships is that it may offer a shortcut to 
improved performance on a whole number of score-cards and benchmarks on which that their 
individual career prospects depend. Employees, on the other hand, have seen it as a way to protect 
jobs from being lost to competitive subsidiaries or from outsourcing. Often, however, by pursuing 
their initial interests both parties discover that they may achieve joint interests by respecting 
simultaneously the interests of their partners. In search for improving products and processes, 
managers are driven to a simultaneous search for good standards of employment and decent 
treatment of employees, as a way to build and sustain partnership trust and high organizational 
performance (Walton et al., 2000). With strong management engagement in these issues, on the 
other hand, employees are likely to share information and knowledge about the practical aspects of 
business operations, and how these can be improved and actively participate in purposeful problem-
solving (Walton et al., 2000). The construction of partnerships thus may encourage both parties to 
change their perception of each other as adversarial actors, facilitating the search for common goals 
and new areas of interest. Employees would increasingly understand and engage in the pursuit of 
solutions to the business problems of the enterprise making it easier to improve on organizational 
performance. Kelly (2004) shows that partnership firms can better adapt to variation in the market 
and create more rapidly jobs than non-partnerships firms.  
 
An important issue of partnership is related to power configurations among the distinct actors. As 
partnerships are formed across employee/employer divides they cannot be symmetric. Therefore 
they may turn into mechanisms of domination and control from the stronger or better-positioned 
partner at the expense of the weaker one(s) (Benson, 1975).  Kelly (2004) argues that the balance of 
power between the partners in a partnership arrangement vary in the same way as employment 
relations. Therefore special attention must be paid to the configuration of power among employers, 
managers, unions and employees when analyzing partnership agreements and their dynamic 
outcomes.  
 
For example, the literature on EWCs shows that the presence of worker representatives in these 
bodies is intrinsically problematic. In many cases representatives are barred from being involved in 
key decisions due to lack of training, difficulties in dealing with foreign languages and cultures, and 
refusal to place on the agendas items of importance to local subsidiaries (references). The idea is 
that employee representatives are allowed into a game that is totally defined by their opponents, a 
game that managers are trained to play and employees not, and in which their partners always play 
the upper hand. We are critical of this line of argument. It misses the dynamic potential of 
partnerships, which is actually dependent on what the actors do within its frame. If managers work 
eagerly to turn it into a body of domination they might simultaneously miss the opportunities that it 
opens up for them. But these opportunities are also dependent on how well the employees play their 
hands and change the game to their advantage. The partners may mutually civilize each other and 
open up for actions that none of the two had held in foresight. And this mutual learning effect is not 
independent of how unions and employers associations are able to back up their members. 
  
The implication of partnership for the trade union movement and for the representatives at the shop 
floor level has been widely discussed in the UK. Ackers and Payne (1998), as mentioned, advocate 
that trade unions should engage positively in the potentials offered by partnership, while Kelly 
(2004) contrarily suggests that partnership agreements are unlikely to contribute significantly to 
union revitalization. Marks et al. (1998) argue a thought provoking position by stating that “ the 
paradox of mutual gains workplace is that it extends the scope of union influence inside corporate 
decision-making processes as it renders the authority of the shop-floor union delegate more 
precarious” (1998:220).  A more Marxist critic of partnership arrangements points out that unions 
through their support favor an ideology of common interests, contribute to limit their own 
independence, and find themselves captured by an agenda imposed by employers (Taylor and 
Ramsey, 1998).  Again our view is that all outcomes are possible, but which will prevail is 
dependent on the wider scope of union transformation, their support for changes in the roles of 
“shop floor union delegates” and their joint effects on managers and employers associations. 
 
It seems possible to create a virtuous circle here that creates agency at the level of local union 
representatives. In the Danish case a “widespread system of worker representation”3 at the firm and 
locality level, high union membership, a peculiar strong position for shop stewards and convenors 
has implied that decentralization of collective bargaining and agreements have strengthened the 
actual influence on the local level. The more agreements they negotiate, the more union-education 
they receive and the more they can establish them as an (paid) “office”, the more actual influence 
they will get (Scheuer, 2003). Thus it takes strong union support to enable local level activists to 
become a local agency that may participate in local partnership. 
 
In Denmark in general, the shop steward plays quite an important role in regulating the games 
between managers and blue-collar workers. The shop steward is responsible for negotiating a 
wide range of agreements between workers and management, between workers and vocational 
institutions, and with other shop stewards. She needs pursue grievances and other work specific 
issues, work to guarantee that workers can have their demands negotiated and attended to, and is 
responsible for reaching agreements not only with management, but also among workers. By 
playing a role in the negotiations between managers and workers, the shop steward tries to reduce 
the direct confrontations between them, eventually attaining the role as an independent party. The 
shop steward is in a position that enables her to negotiate with the management all changes in the 
organization of work. Not because the law prescribes it (on the contrary, the Danish labor market 
law gives sovereignty to management to manage (in exchange workers right to organize), but all 
actors involved assume that negotiation is anybody’s right, and necessary for conducting changes 
and resolving problems. In this way, the Danish system is continually built on the basis of 
negotiation and agreements among the different groups.  
 
                                                 
3 Andersen 2005 gives a very useful overview of both formal and informal modes of participation in the Danish system. 
The shop steward no only has to try to find solutions for the workers’ problems, the function is 
also often extended to negotiations of issues that in other places pertain to management. The shop 
steward is in this way co-responsible for the continuous improvement of the organization, not 
only to protect workers from any kind of downgrading of working conditions, but also to achieve 
agreements where the organization is able to support the process of skill-upgrading and higher 
productivity.  When the factory faces market problems, the shop steward is called to negotiate 
possible solutions with the workers, which for example can imply sending workers on courses, or 
negotiating a list of workers to be dismissed. 
 
Our own research shows that in some cases this agency is radically expanded if a Danish firm 
becomes a subsidiary. Typically, this expansion follows a quite distinct evolutionary dynamic.  
Shop stewards start the emerging partnership with local managers by engaging themselves in work 
place transformations. They continues with mutual negotiation of training policies, starts worrying 
about the potential loss of managerial partners, negotiate themselves into selection committees for 
coming managerial recruitment, build up their local reputation to a global one by assisting in 
resolving significant “crises”. This gives them access to distant HQs, which they can use to alter the 
organizational framework conditions (transfer prices, budgetary constraints, benchmarks) in favor 
of the gradual evolution of the local plant. This evolution may pursue quite unexpected strategies 
for improving work arrangements and being socially responsible (by recruiting disabled and 
emigrants). Following this virtuous circle of partnering, union shop floor representatives often 
become the architects of benchmarking factories, the principle of which becomes transferred to 
foreign countries by a process in which many blue collar workers act as international consultants.  
Thus, both the hierarchical structure of the subsidiary, the identities and roles of its agents and their 
mutual relations are changing in radical ways. Currently, this change is rather into a very confused 
state in which schizophrenic divisions prevail between a managerial hierarchy and team-based 
organizational forms at shop floor and in R&D, and between the remnants of the old hierarchy. In 
this new negotiated order among teams and hierarchy, union representatives function as trouble-
shooters for, in principle, unsolvable problems in order to secure the holistic working of an 
emerging high-performance organization, searching for a more robust structuring or ordering. 
Located in these positions employee representatives seem at least to be in a similar powerful role in 
defining the future as are their partners on the managerial side (Kristensen 2003; Kristensen and 
Zeitlin, 2005; Lotz and Kristensen, 2005). They share the fate of travelling into an unknown future. 
 One of the strengths, which union representatives carry into this partnership, is their knowledge of 
and relations to the wider welfare institutions in the Danish society. Through the network to the 
wider union organization and in turn this organization’s relations to institutions, shop stewards and 
convenors are able to make the larger society work in tandem with changes in the focal firm. 
Vocational institutions can be addressed to solve problems that enable employees to adapt to new 
work arrangements, job specifications and projects through courses – taylorized or standard – to a 
high degree financed by the state. New employees can be recruited in collaboration with the Job 
Center, unemployment funds, technical schools and other training centers (see more on this in 
Kristensen, 1994; 2003 and Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005).  Shop floor union representatives may 
also use this network to influence authorities at municipal level, so that favorable schemes for both 
the firm and the authorities can be created to the benefit of disabled, immigrants and other 
potentially marginalized groups. But the dynamic also works in the opposite direction. The new 
high performance forms of organization are very stressful for employee groups down the line and 
may easily lead to burn-outs, abuse of alcohol or other forms of abuse, broken families, etc. To cope 
with that, some firms have created advisory boards at the firm level that can link up employees in 
trouble with the various public institutions before a personal crisis becomes manifest. Having firm 
representatives (shop stewards and HR-managers) address these institutions instead of the 
individual, facilitates the structuring of a tailor-made system for supporting the individual at an 
earlier stage, a system through which the firm and various institutions collaborate to bring the 
individual back on his feet. These are but a few examples of how union representatives may assist 
the firm in turning the institutions of a society into very supportative resources that enable the firm 
to do more far reaching and risky experiments with its organizational form. 
 
It is apparent that union representatives are also engaging in activities for which they are not 
equipped. It is highly unlikely that they have been trained in issues such as head-hunting the right 
managers, principles of budgetary discretion, transfer-prices and other important principles for 
governing the workings of an organization. Neither are they prepared to actually set the direction of 
strategic nor organizational change processes as they have hardly studied the ongoing streams of 
texts that usually inspire managers, consultants and business school students. One might invoke that 
it is the duty of managers to carry this form of knowledge and inspiration into the experimental 
laboratory of such subsidiary firms, which also constantly receive a stream of novel impulses, 
demands and suggestions from their HQs, which again is receiving similar “inspirations” from 
consultants, financial institutions and –analysts. 
 
If unions and their shop floor representatives accept this division of labor among them and us, they 
obviously become “captured by an agenda imposed by employers” as a Marxist critique have 
pointed out. Visser (2005:302) also points out that this put unions under extra pressure: “The 
Danish case shows that there may be a trade-off, with both sides winning something; though even 
here, with high union membership, this puts much pressure on the national unions since they must 
provide adequate services to local representatives and redirect resources and staff from the centre.” 
 
If, however, it could be taken for granted that this “agenda”, set by employers, would serve the 
long-term interests of the subsidiary firm, where partnerships are initiated, it would be 
unproblematic that employees take start from this agenda and then try modifying to work in their 
favor, too. However, this reformist possibility cannot be immediately trusted, given how the post-
modern world functions with respects to managerial behavior. First, management and organization 
has turned into a fashion industry, where new templates and recipes incessantly change. Second, 
these templates and recipes are imposed top-down by financial institutions and HQs as stabilizing 
novel demands for benchmarks, principles of work and of strategy, which often have very little 
resemblance with the logic of developing the subsidiary firm. Third, these shifts in managerial and 
organizational thinking are only a few of several sources of volatility among managers at different 
levels of companies, meaning that they have difficulties in sustaining both political coalitions and 
the kind of partnerships, we are addressing. The problem for the subsidiary firm is that it risks being 
directed in arbitrary directions from one moment to the next by shifting managers with shifting 
managerial philosophies and ideas. This may have a great experimental potential, but if the union 
representatives are not able to learn from these experiments in a cumulative way, no agent seems to 
be. Consequently and paradoxically, it is only employees and their representatives that may be able 
to take on the responsibility for accumulating lessons gained from experimental exercises and 
institutionalize them into a more or less coherent set of practices, because managers have become 
very mobile and managerial positions very volatile. In this way, union representatives become the 
“long-term entrepreneurs”. 
 
If unions, and especially shop floor union representatives, cannot support their members in taking 
on this entrepreneurial role of learning from experiments and experiences, both the firm and its 
members risk becoming victimized in more than one respect by the restless fashion industry of post-
modern management. On the other hand, if unions and their local representatives are able to 
navigate and set a direction, they might highly benefit from these restless shifts as they continuously 
will provide unions and representatives with impulses for doubt, reflection and for reformulating 
their own more systematic search for better alternatives and better practices. Such a situation could 
then indeed turn partnerships into regimes of continuous improvements with a novel division of 
labor among the partners. Deliberation within the frame of deliberate democracy would change and 
so would the nature of the partnership.     
 
As indicated, we see partnerships as a dynamic form of organization, constantly in a state of 
experimental change and search for improvements. This means that it is less useful to make 
typologies dependent on the current stage of dominance/equality among the partners (e.g. Guest and 
Pecci, 2001; Teague, 2005). We take for granted that if a partner takes on a new role in a successful 
way, this partner may temporarily dominate the agenda until its opponent/partner redefines its 
respective roles and thus condition its “opponent” to do the same in an unending chain. Rather 
partnerships should be assessed on whether they open up for such experimental and mutual 
redefinition. And this is much more dependent on which rules they follow in their mutual games 
than on their current position at a specific point in time. What matters is, for instance, 
“transparency, scope and depth of issues, credibility of the partners engagement in each others 
problems, degree of commitment, the incorporation of external stakeholders and evaluation 
procedures”, as has been pointed out by Kochan (1999). This raises methodological questions on 
how to research partnerships. Assuming that they are initiated at a certain point in time and develop 
principles/rules of operation, what become of focal interest is their logic of evolution and how this 
may be influenced by the larger societal context. Thus, partnerships should not simply be evaluated 
on their constellation at a specific point in time, but for their ability to improve over time (Coulson, 
2005:151) and for their future potential. For this reason, we pay special attention to the narratives 
that our respondents tell us about their experiences over the time with partnership on various 
organizational levels and among shifting actors. This indicates a very chaotic process with periods 
of surprising progress alternating with dramatic setbacks. In MNCs, subsidiary managers in some 
places are frequently shifting names, while union shop floor representatives in Denmark may not be 
reelected. At a stage where such partnerships are often established dependent on the gradual 
construction of personal trust and informal rules of the game, they tend to become highly volatile. 
And yet they seem able to become cumulative over time, primarily because their track records 
become narrated by the participants’ joint authorship. The participants, on the other hand, use these 
narratives as reflections of good and bad experiences, thereby creating a readiness for initiating 
novel experiments. 
 
To make them more robust, however, takes the active involvement from organized interests and 
ways to align it with the larger institutional structure within a society so that partnerships can more 
offensively benefit from constructed complementarities between the societal and firm level. Before 
we look into this, we will go a step deeper with respect to internal firm reform. 
 
 
 
High performance work systems 
 
The end of Fordism has been seen as a shift to a radically different way of arranging work and of 
organizing. Whereas Fordism could be fairly well described, it is much less so with the emerging 
forms of organizing and of arranging work and jobs. Whereas Fordism emphasized routinization 
and automatization, the emerging paradigm is in favour of flexibility, quality, lean operational 
procedures, just-in-time and continuous improvement and innovation, i.e. high performance towards 
customers, shareholders, etc. 
 
The literature on high-performance work systems (HPWS) can broadly be divided in three streams. 
First, there are those who are quite positive and see important changes in this new way of 
organizing industrial relations also in relation to workers and other employees. For those authors, 
empowerment, participation in decision making, reintegration of conception and execution, 
increasing control over tasks allocation, and continuous skill improvements of employees are some 
of the characteristics that follow in the wake of HPWSs. High-performance work systems are said 
also to be replacing the hierarchical structure associated with traditional forms of work 
organization, as they require workers to have autonomy over their job tasks, to participate in self-
directed teams, to be part of problem-solving and other offline teams, and to regularly communicate 
with employees outside their work groups (Appelbaum et al. 2000;  Whitfeld and Pole, 1997).  
 
Huselid (1995) evaluated the links between systems of High Performance Work Practices and firm 
performance, including labor turnover, sales per employee and an indicator of financial 
performance. He interpreted his results as showing strong positive effects between HPWP and 
performance, concluding that a range of innovative human resource management practices, when 
combined, can have synergetic effects through an interactive and mutually reinforcing positive 
impact on performance. Other studies have shown similar results in distinct sectors and industries 
(Ichniowski et al. 1998, MacDuffie 1995; Berg et al. 1996). By the end of the last decade, a number 
of studies have held the view that as different changes in work systems accumulate they form 
complementarities (Ichniowski et al. 1997). These in many ways function as circles of 
reinforcement, implying that the efficiency of one measure is propelled by the efficiency of another 
and vice versa. 
 
 Rubinstein and Kochan (2001) argue that the implementation of HPWS creates opportunities for 
union renewal. In many ways such work systems comply with many of the non-salary issues, which 
unions for years have been advocating. Therefore unions could see these changes as an invitation to 
abandon their traditional, adversarial role in favour of a new, collaborative one. Godard and 
Delaney (2000) explore the differences between HRM-advocates and the proponents of HPWS. 
They argue that the latter are more supportive of unions, as unions enhance the benefits associated 
with new work arrangements and HRM practices and ensure that employers do not revert to 
traditional arrangements and ways of making decisions. In this way, partnerships and HPWS can be 
seen as a way of expanding the participation of trade unions in the governance of firms, in 
subsidiaries of MNCs and through EWCs of entire MNCs. Unions are necessary as they might 
stimulate workers’ participation, that again enable organizational learning, that leads to 
improvements in performance, work conditions and working life so that a mutual beneficial system 
come into being. 
 
A second strand of more skeptical researchers is critical to the organizational and institutional 
effects of HPWS. Harley argues that HPWS can be used to undermine labor. Management might 
have seen the weakened position of labor as an opportunity to de-unionize their organizations, by 
utilizing participation to gain employee compliance and reduce employee reliance on unions as a 
means of influencing outcomes (Harley, 2005:51). In this perspective HPWS is used to separate 
employees from their unions by an offer, which the employees cannot reject. Others are skeptical as 
to whether the offer itself is so beneficial to employees. Ramsay et al. (2000), for instance, find that 
employees enjoy some benefits (e.g. higher discretion) in HPWS. But these benefits are frequently 
far outweighed by work intensification, insecurity and stress (see also Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992). 
To these observers many scholars have accepted far too uncritically the promises of positive 
employee outcomes of HPWS. Proponents of this view think we are in need of a novel form of 
union militancy that can fight back, rather than go into partnerships to develop them further (Voos, 
1997). Support of this view comes from a camp that sees HPWS as a strategy developed against 
unions, as it might be difficult for unions to deal with these novel management techniques, which 
do not use cash exchange relationship over which unions usually bargain. Thus Fiorito et al. (1987: 
124–5) find very early that alternative (progressive) human resources policies associated with 
employee participation is a successful way to keep shops union-free. Wood (1999: 391, 403–4) has 
blamed proponents of HPWS for having highlighted findings supporting the high-performance 
paradigm while forgetting findings that do not.  
 
A third stream sees the changes in a more contextual perspective. Martinez Lucio and Stuart (2004) 
look at the meaning and significance of the partnership strategies for trade unions in England, and 
show the changing meaning of the concept for the trade union and the problems related to the 
identity and union purpose related to it. They argue that the limited nature of involvement in 
decision making and the lack of investment in training and education of the workforce in Britain 
may have had a negative impact on the development of partnership relations. Godard (2004) argues 
that the limitations to HPWS are likely to be greater in liberal market economies than in co-
ordinated market economies. In liberal market economies HPWSs may even be less effective than 
traditional personnel practices (2004:370).  
 
The debates about the characteristics and the effects of HPWS are thus unresolved. The different 
and in many ways divergent theoretical as well as ideological positions reflect quite distinct ways of 
interpreting and analyzing HPWS, its effects, and potentials. Edwards et al. (2006) in their highly 
interesting article resolves, in a way, this debate by showing how cases might be sorted out as 
different outcomes in terms of control and developmental concerns for labor compared to capital. 
Theoretically, the number of different possible outcomes is large and they demonstrate how 
different cases can have very different outcomes both for capital and labor and be shifting over 
time. 
 
 Our purpose here is not to advocate the advantages of HPWS or to criticize them for not delivering 
what they promise. Our intention is to investigate whether and how these models are being or can 
be translated, negotiated and reconstructed among organizational groups in such a way that they 
offer viable organizational forms, enabling participants to cope with globalization and volatile 
economic situations to their mutual benefit. We will focus in particular on the role played by shop 
stewards and convenors in negotiating these systems, and from this discuss the potential new role 
that trade unions could play by supporting convenors. Despite divergent assumptions and analyses, 
the literature agrees that HPWS and partnerships are focal points of orientation having great 
influence on the future of work and the organizations that embed these new work arrangements. 
 
Our observations of work place reform in a number of factories owned by MNCs, in a small and 
quite coherent society as Denmark, bear evidence to a pattern of great variability of very different 
forms of HPWS (as also suggested by Edwards, et al. 2006). This variability is far from captured by 
the usual dichotomy of “lean” and “socio-technical” work arrangements (Lotz and Kristensen, 
2005; Hodson, 2001)), a duality that sees them either as benefiting capital or labor. Though teams 
are usually constitutive for the organization of work in such work arrangements, teams have been 
created for very different reasons. Sometimes employees and shop stewards have taken the 
initiative, other times they have been initiated by reform-eager managers. In some top managers 
appoint team leaders, and in others team members elect team leaders. In many places, the team 
leader position simply is rotated among the team. We have even observed a factory in which it was 
the board of the enterprise union-club that appointed team leaders among its members. Thus in 
some arrangements the new forms of work organization could be seen as an extension of the old 
hierarchical principles, in others it could be seen as an extension of the shop steward system and a 
great increase in the autonomy of the worker collective (           ) vis-à-vis management. Interesting 
enough a “rotation rule” seems from our preliminary findings, to be a principle by which the teams 
are able to develop the highest form of reflective internal community, mutual understanding and 
ability to share commitment. Thus, it is at this level that the decisive things happen, that workers 
become so self-reflective on their work, that they take on the former role of managers to 
continuously improve quality, productivity, etc. 
 
In all studied firms, teams coexisted with remnants of the old hierarchical administration. In some, 
the entire hierarchy down to foremen was maintained, but instead of directing individual 
workstations, foremen were now expected to coach the autonomous or semi-autonomous team. In 
other firms, the only parts of the administrative hierarchy left, were upper positions as technical- 
and production-managers and supporting HR-managerial services with which team leaders would 
communicate directly. But in most cases, shop stewards and convenors had gained greater 
importance. Most notably, one company had grown from a small plant of 35 employees to 450 
without hiring a single foreman. It has expanded the number of  union representatives from 1 to 35, 
and they were essentially responsible for personal administration, control of performance, 
coordination among teams, hiring and firing, planning of holidays, circulation of personnel in case 
of sickness, etc, etc. In another firm, shop stewards and convenors were seen as a force for 
horizontal coordination, supplementing and being complementary to day to day hierarchical control 
of the managerial corpse. In this system “partnership” and “hierarchy” as organizational principle 
were constantly contested each other in search of competitive solutions to pressurizing problems. In 
a third firm, shop stewards and convenors would, in close collaboration with a production manager, 
take on the role to monitor that lower level managerial responsibilities were handled after the 
principles of partnership and team and employee discretion. Union representatives had 
deliberatively become the forces that would safeguard the cultivation of the new “regime”. Finally, 
of course, in some of our cases neither shop stewards nor convenors played such an active direct 
role, but rather oversaw that reforms, practices and their administration were not developing in 
ways contradicting, breaking, or obscuring central or local agreements between employer and 
employees or their associations. 
 
It is evident that it is only in the last type of behavior that the traditional roles of union and 
enterprise representatives comply with the new situation. In all the three other cases, shop stewards 
and convenors are embarking on role-definitions that surpass any scope that unions have imagined 
or are preparing their activists for. And it is obvious that the more beneficial these activists can 
develop these new roles, seen from management, the more gain will it potentially bring to the 
employee side in setting the agenda for the experimental course of the enterprise. 
 Thus if unions had policies for how to evolve enterprises towards a favored version of the new 
economy, if they had reflected on how gradually to formalize new forms of influence and if they 
trained their activists to take on new roles, it is very difficult to see the limits to this participatory 
dynamic. Furthermore, as this level of organization -  between the apex and teams - is also decisive 
for what becomes the roles of team leaders and team members, for the discretion of teams, and for 
the governance of the mutual interaction among them, unions could gain influence on business 
organization beyond the magnitude of previous experience.  
 
Drawing on the third European Survey on Working Conditions undertaken in the 15 member 
nations of the European Union in 2000, Lorenz and Valeyre (2003: 13) find that Denmark (together 
with the Netherlands and to a lesser degree Sweden, Austria and Finland) prove to have a 
overrepresentation of the “learning” form of work organization (compared to the “traditional”, 
“Taylorist” and “lean” forms). The learning  form “is characterized by the over-representation of 
the variables measuring autonomy and task complexity, learning and problem solving and to a 
lesser degree by an overrepresentation of the variable measuring individual responsibility for 
quality management. The variables reflecting monotony, repetitiveness and work rate constraints 
are under-represented.” (Ibid:6). 
 
Whereas the ”lean” form (as in the case of “Taylorism”) is characterized by a number of managerial 
principles (teams, job rotation, and quantitative production norms), these seem to be absent in the 
“learning” form. This could indicate that the cell 3 with “workers control” concerning development 
concerns are at least not as impossible to imagine as Edwards et al. (2006: 132) makes it look. 
Ironically, our findings seem to indicate that in such forms of enterprises, owned by foreign 
multinationals, it is actually the workers and in particular their elected representatives that even 
more than managers are concerned about how to secure and guarantee the long-term development 
of “their” plant. And they are intensively discussing – not new principles of governance – but the 
incoherence of the current. 
 
Given that the remnants of the old hierarchy continuously produces streams of problems because 
managers sometimes slip into old habits, shop stewards and convenors are busy trying to repair 
potential damage and to regain trust-relations, so that local managers in Danish subsidiaries do not 
harm the ability of workers to deliver according to the benchmarks that foreign owners hold as a 
criterion for not intervening. Danish managers are highly divided in their attitude to this system. 
Some oppose, but often it is the CEOs of subsidiaries that are most radically in favor of the  new 
system of autonomous work groups (see e.g. Kristensen and Zeitling, 2005). Such persons have 
voiced quite radical ways for reorganizing the entire firm after new governance principles. One 
suggested, given that teams were evaluated according to their performance (according to a system 
of benchmarks) and their contribution to the overall results of the subsidiary, that the different 
management functions should be measured according to their ability to assist the teams in achieving 
improvements in performance and innovation. This could be done by making it voluntary for 
individual teams to demand “managerial services” either from their own organization or from 
subcontractors. The irony of this suggestion is of course that the investment bargaining game that is 
institutionalized among subsidiaries in a MNC and among teams within a subsidiary is in this way 
turned against subsidiary managers, which will only survive and grow if teams demand their 
services. The turn from hierarchy to market-relations where demand for developmental services by 
work teams shapes the groupings of managerial functions/teams, could eventually also be used to 
radically reform relations between subsidiaries and headquarters of a MNC.  
 
The great advantage with this suggestion is that it helps us divorce ourselves from old habits of 
thinking, when studying and reasoning about the new forms of organization. It is obvious that we 
have only half-baked concepts as to which managerial roles that are compatible with HPWS at the 
level of plants, and between highly innovative subsidiaries and corporate or MNC headquarters, not 
to mention relations to suppliers that participate in the process of continuous improvement and 
innovation with their OEMs (Zeitlin and Whitford ????). However, the radical formulation of the 
market principle also allows us to see some defects in current degenerated hierarchies. In principle, 
only teams, sections, etc., of the workplace that “delivers” according to benchmarks will survive. 
This means that the whole organization becomes very short-term oriented. Emergent novel teams 
with less well defined work tasks, the benefits of which have not yet become clear for the 
surrounding organization will face less demand and therefore become de-selected before its 
potentials have been demonstrated. 
 
As far as we can see, this means that work-, managerial-, sales- and R&D-teams need to have a 
mutual negotiation procedure giving them the opportunity to explain and compare current 
performance against future promises. Such a negotiation procedure would not only allow them to 
reveal future aspirations and find ways to benchmark their possible contributions to the future 
performance of the firm. It would also allow them to become informed about the possible services 
that other teams could help supply in their process of achieving agreed upon aims and benchmarks. 
Obviously, this would institutionalize within a regime of short-term competitive rivalry a procedure 
for long-term cooperation that would pressurize partners continually to reflect on developmental 
goals and to rationalize on how these comply with larger societal changes. Obviously, these 
considerations point towards a constitutional ordering of the enterprise, which breaks with both 
markets and hierarchies, and towards what has been called a networked form of organization, which 
needs to be formed though a deliberate democracy (Sabel,    ). 
 
We think that such a new organizational form is unconsciously in the making in some firms. In 
some of our interviews in Danish MNC-subsidiaries, the organization became so incomprehensible 
from the official organization chart that we kept pushing our respondents to explain how and by 
whom a series of cross-team problems would be solved. They finally revealed a number of 
committees, where employee and managers from different parts of the company were discussing 
joint problems. In one company of approximate 100 employees it turned out that 18 ad hoc 
committees were currently in operation, each negotiating and searching for solutions to overriding 
problems. But before we asked, neither managers nor convenor were aware that such a negotiating 
order was negotiating bits and pieces of the ordering of the company. Another way of organizing 
similar activities is to institutionalize within the primary work teams dispersed responsibilities, so 
that workers, besides their primary tasks, are responsible for looking for e.g. internal or external 
logistics, work environment and health issues, quality level, etc. Across primary teams the relevant 
persons meet regularly in secondary teams to discuss common concerns and to compare 
improvements. Apart from helping workers become more able and recognized members in both 
team communities (Lotz and Kristensen, 2005) this means that impulses for doubt and search is 
continually circulated in the company across the manager and employee divide. 
 
However, a recurrent theme in our interviews is that agreed initiatives are often not implemented. 
This makes workers highly critical of management and reinforces a pattern where shop stewards 
and convenors take on the role of trying to make managers at different levels comply with promises. 
The problem, which follows from the nature of things, being that middle managers of the line 
seldom have cross- organizational concerns as their primary responsibility and are above all 
focusing on orders, benchmarks and concerns that are filtered down hierarchically from the top – 
ultimately from the MNC HQ. The paradox is that a deliberate democracy succeeds in creating a 
much more self-conscious public, which lacks an administrative apparatus to enforce its decisions. 
 
Unions and convenors in these situations often have a tendency to reinforce what remains of the old 
hierarchy, not least by trying to involve local top managers as much as possible in processes of 
implementation. However, it is indeed strange that they are not working in a more systemic way 
with the problem. 
 
One option would be to translate concerns or decisions into benchmarks and to integrate them into 
balanced scorecards together with the stream of benchmarks that filter down from MNC HQs. In 
this way it would become much clearer which and when HQ concerns and workplace concerns 
collide, discover the need for balancing, or for conflicting developmental routes of the subsidiary. 
This could eventually lead to new rounds of negotiations in which the overarching routes of 
developing companies could become part of the agenda. 
 
One option in Denmark would be to re-evoke the work councils to take on the role of negotiating on 
top of the negotiating committees or secondary teams of the work organization. This would reflect 
that the new organization is indeed shaped through the opposing claims of capital and labor and that 
the constant re-figuration of the organization is by principle dependent on constant deliberation of 
two concerns, which may constantly need to search for novel ways to compromise. 
 
In such a system unions would take on a new and very crucial role. First, unions should constantly 
help firm level worker representatives to formulate their goals in benchmarks, furnish them with 
alternative ways of organizing, search for solutions to organizational dilemmas, etc., which could 
make the role of convenors and shop stewards much more active in proposing alternatives in 
negotiations on company reforms. Second, they should constantly find ways to elaborate the formal 
institutions of collaboration (the role of convenors and shop stewards, the formal authority of WCs 
vis-à-vis both normal managerial hierarchies and the ad-hocracies of committees and secondary 
teams. To us it is obvious that WCs hold the potential to become the monitoring center for how to 
improve the ability for continuous improvements on which the whole firm depends, both in terms of 
its attractiveness to workers and to shareholders. Thirdly, unions should take on a very new and 
unusual role. As the search for new experimental solutions to the problems of the new constitutional 
ordering goes on in the firms, unions could be the body that monitor individual firms’ experiments, 
and compare and develop meta-order benchmarks that allow for cross enterprise learning. Without 
taking on this role, it is indeed difficult to see how experience gets stored. In the new global order, 
firms do not necessarily survive or die because of their market strength. Rather closures or new 
investments are dependent on negotiations within the framework of the political bodies of MNCs – 
and here there is currently no mechanism to guarantee a fair selection process  (Kristensen and 
Zeitlin, 2005). 
 
EWCs and trade unions  
 
This, of course, makes it very important to consider how unions might be able to civilize and make 
more fair how MNC HQs select among the favorable and less-favorable subsidiaries (and countries) 
in their overarching strategies and budgetary dispositions. In principle, it could be an option for 
unions to try influence these political processes through European Work Councils. 
 
Over the last decade EWC has been discussed extensively, both the agreement establishing them ( ) 
and their development as organizations ( ). The literature is quite divergent on the analysis of the 
impact of EWCs on different institutions. There are basically three different positions. First, some 
authors are quite supportative of this new institution and see it as a form of intervention into 
corporate governance: the directive creates new structures of regulation by involving worker 
representation in decision-making (Jensen et al,, 1999; Lecher et al,, 1999).  Others, the so-called 
Euro-pessimists (Waddington, 2003) are quite critical, pointing out that the possibilities for 
companies to opt out of already limited requirements are large and the flexibility of the directive 
leads to neo-voluntarist arrangements (Falkner, 1998), which in turn leads to the erosion of the 
national industrial relations standards, once the EWCs are separated from national structures of 
representation (Streeck, 1997) and trade unions have insufficient resources to generate cohesive 
policies and to articulate activity across Europe (Keller, 1995). The potential for a European 
industrial citizenship is just as much of an illusion, because the directive can be used to limit 
employee participation as it may simply be used to distribute information (Streeck, 1997).  Taking a 
radical position in a well quoted article, Streeck (1997) points out that EWCs are neither European 
nor works councils’ and ‘will certainly assist [multi]national companies (MNCs) in building 
company-centered and management-driven industrial relations or human resource regimes’ (1997b: 
325, 333). Hancké (2000) takes the full step and sees EWCs as a body where MNC managers can 
actually exercise regime-shopping and play out subsidiaries mutually in investment bargaining. 
 
Others, however, see the EWCs in a more contingent and contextual perspective. Waddington 
(2003) shows that the form and character of EWCs are likely to be strongly influenced by the 
national IR traditions in the company's country of origin (see also Muller and Hoffmann, 2001). 
Gold and Hall (1992) show differences in format between the joint management-employee EWCs 
in French-based companies and the employee-only EWCs in some German-based companies, which 
would reflect national works council institutions in the two countries (see also Rehfeldt (1998) for 
the French-based). American and British companies have resisted the adoption of the directive 
(Gold and Hall, 1992) and are still resistant to the possible changes in the governance of the firm 
that the EWCs can bring about. Knudsen and Bruun (1998) reveal that the tradition of Nordic trade 
unionism (decentralized approach to company-specific issues) implies that agreements are 
negotiated by employee-representatives, which limits the involvement of trade union officials in the 
EWCs’. Marginson et al. (1998) find that agreements in Anglo-Irish and non-European MNCs show 
stronger signs of management-dominated procedures than do agreements in continental European 
MNCs.  
 
In spite of that, the literature is largely silent on the impact of EWCs on the process and outcome of 
management’s decision-making process (Muller and Hoffman, 2001; Marginson et al., 2004) and 
whether it may represent for trade unions a challenge or a threat to its revitalization. Waddington 
(2003) adds that EWCs are at different stages of development, thus they can not be assumed to 
pertain to a single category, as both euro-optimists and euro-pessimists tend to do (Waddington, 
2003:323 ). In Denmark, as in other Nordic countries, with its history of co-operative industrial 
relations, our research shows how the employee-representatives are making use of this new 
institution to negotiate their local problems and to get access to the headquarters and thus initiate a 
dialogue of mutual recognition and understanding (Kristensen, 2003). It might be the case that the 
solidary behavior of the Danish representatives can influence the perception and the actions of other 
representatives, who are more skeptical towards partnership arrangements. They may even be even 
able to change the ways in which EWCs can be used as an effective tool for cooperation among not 
only representatives within the multinational companies but also for trade unions across national 
boundaries. How far this can go seems rather dependent on the competence, imagination and 
strategies of employee representatives than on any other issue (Knudsen and Sørensen, 2000). 
Again the question is: How may unions assist employee representatives in taking on agency? 
 
In the Danish case, this flows from our arguments so far. Danish employee representatives are 
likely to be convenors and members of national work councils. Obviously, if they have engaged 
themselves in the overarching discussion on how to balance between top-down and bottom-up 
concerns in strategies and the composition of benchmarks, they will be equipped with the best of all 
tools for initiating negotiations with HQ executives on these topics. The more this proves successful 
in investment bargaining, the more it will force representatives from other countries to do the same. 
If representatives’ capacities for influencing management decisions become the benchmark for 
assessing their effectiveness as representatives, the efect may be the spreading a more solidary 
attitude among representatives in order to create a system through which they can strengthen their 
joint capacities.  This has the potential to turn EWCs into a forum in which the parties actually 
reveal as much as possible what are the current situation and future potential of their plants, so that 
a discussion may evolve on how they may best strike a balance between their individual 
developments. This could lead to better-informed decisions on how to select projects and destinies 
among subsidiaries. It might also open the floor for the subsidiaries to ask HQs as to how they see 
their role as being a service to subsidiaries, eventually educating subsidiaries in the art of managing 
financial assets, investors and shareholders, etc.  
 
As soon as this opposite way of doing investment bargaining has become initiated, unions might 
use their mutual transnational relations to educate each other, to the best of their abilities, in the art 
of supporting EWC-representatives and how to become advanced negotiators capable of influencing 
and catering to the respect of HQ-managers. As shown elsewhere this dynamic might 
simultaneously combine with a major transformation of the European Community, where citizens 
from different localities collaborate across country borders in reconstructing MNCs as international 
collaborative associations (Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005). 
 
Unions and Europeanization 
 
However, unions have not had their eyes directed towards such a major transformation of neither 
the MNC nor the individual bond between (subsidiary) enterprises and their host region. Instead 
unions have seen Europeanization and globalization as carrying with them the promises of a neo-
liberal turn. Through ETUC and associated bodies they have tried initiate for years a pan-European 
corporatism in which they could repeat the previous success of Keynesian corporatism in such 
countries as Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavian. Ideally they have aspired for a system 
that could prevent “a race to the bottom” by setting up European bodies, where the social partners 
together with EU could bargain over level and conditions of employment, wage levels etc. 
(Waddingtron, 2005). But as Marginson and Sisson (2004) argue, we are presently very far from a 
system of centralized bargaining or of pan-European Keynesianism. Rather in country after country, 
we have witnessed a race to decentralized and local bargaining, reflecting partly the turn in 
enterprise restructuring, as reported above ( ). 
 
However, as far as we can judge, unions in European countries are still very much directed towards 
the shaping of a pan-European corporatism that imitates the heydays of Keynesianism. 
(This will later be documented) 
 
This orientation means not only that a lot of resources are directed towards lobbying at the 
European level. It means simultaneously that unions at national levels to a high degree orient their 
bureaucracies towards the EU-bureaucracy, and make the European-wide technocratic dialogue set 
their national agenda. 
 
To our surprise, we found that many of the “demands” formulated by unions and employers 
associations in preparation of Danish national centralized bargaining, reflected European wide 
social dialogues – though it was not revealed as stemming from the EU. 
(The documentation will follow later) 
 
Obviously, these European-wide issues may only arbitrarily reflect the needs, challenges and 
opportunities that activists experience, when they are engaged in local partnerships, the evolution of 
high performance work systems, the fight for the survival of a subsidiary within a MNC or the 
reconstruction of a EWC towards an international deliberative democracy. To local union activists, 
it seems as if union-bureaucracies have focused their attention in a highly erroneous direction. 
 
We think that this illustrates very well the huge dilemma that unions and employers associations are 
facing in the age of globalization. They need both to work on an international scale with and within 
international organizations. On the other hand they also need to be much more focussed on local 
experiments in order to find ways of civilizing and codifying these, so that a direction towards a 
gradually improving society is negotiated. This will involve – as we have seen – ways to empower 
and build up the capability of local activists and make unions experts on the evolution of 
enterprises. Obviously, unions cannot march in both directions without facing a basic crisis of 
direction, especially given that they are often facing a serious financial crisis with the gradual loss 
of members – even in such countries as Denmark. 
 
We think that a way out of this dilemma is for the unions to focus their interest not so much on the 
centralized bargaining institutions, wages and employment as on building up complex institutions 
that can help shape a labor market that assists individual employees in undertaking complex careers 
at work, that gradually heighten their bargaining power and support shop stewards and convenors 
with a powerful constituency that reproduce their respective power in partnerships, enterprise-
restructuring, etc. It is exactly in the Danish labor market that we may find the reasons why shop 
stewards and convenors have been able to play a powerful role in such partnerships, despite the fact 
that the Danish unions for a while misdirected their attention. 
 
 
Labour markets as a powerbase of unions: Revisiting Danish Flexi-curity 
 
The Danish labour market has been characterized in the recent literature ( ) as a flexicurity model, 
which  combines  labor market flexibility and social security. The literature has emphasized that the 
Danish system combines high welfare benefits with easy access for firms to hire or fire employees. 
In our view the system encompasses much more than that, presenting quite distinctive and 
interesting features, which benefit different actors in the labor market. One of the fascinating 
features of Danish flexicurity is a highly mobile labor force that, supported by welfare schemes, has 
the possibility to continuously upgrade skills so they can actively influence work organization, the 
formation of networks among firms and create a rivalry among firms over recruiting attractive 
workers.   
 
In the Danish system the welfare benefits are used not only for proportioning high levels of social 
equality. An important, if not the most important, effect of the welfare regime is the possibility of 
workers to upgrade skills through continuous training, not only during unemployment periods but 
also at different stages in the work career.  The combination of high mobility and continuous skills 
upgrading produces a labor force that frequently moves among employers and builds work careers 
across many firms and therefore accumulate many social ties. 
   
During our interviews it was apparent that for a substantial number of employees remaining for 
more than two or three years with the same firm was not seen as a satisfactory alternative. Rather 
employees interpret their mobility as an important contribution to their skill enlargement and 
security against unemployment. Rather than being fired, the main reason for workers to shift job is 
the need for new challenges (). We think that this is the chief explanation of why Danish firms have 
become very oriented towards “learning modes of organizing” ( Lorenz and Valeyre, 2003).  These 
features contradict the vision of a flexible labor market, which is generally related to economic 
insecurity and degradation of workers rights in working life. Flexibility in the Danish case increases 
the bargaining power of workers vis-à-vis employers, as we shall see.  
 
 
Once workers improve their skills by using the welfare schemes and keep high levels of mobility, 
they improve their employability as well as reduces the possibilities of downward mobility, since 
firms need to compete to recruit the best employees by offering good wages, challenging work and 
good working conditions (Kristensen, 1996).  This high level of workforce mobility also creates a 
virtuous circle which improves and boosts the formation of networks among firms. By keeping 
good relationships to their former colleagues and employers, Danish workers help firms to build 
strong ties of collaboration and information sharing. High internal skill levels and rich access to 
external skills in other firms, make firms look for challenges beyond current routines. Skills in this 
way become self-propelling. 
 
From this perspective the active labor market strategies are not those which force workers to find 
jobs, but a set of interacting features which increases the bargaining power of the labor force, 
enabling it more actively to choose its own destiny. The right of the workers to desire, search and 
create flexible skills is a powerful force, driving the move towards loosely coupled relationships 
between workers and firms, which in turn support experimentation, learning and performance 
improvement. In this sense, the Danish system has been quite successful in supporting the freedom 
of choice for workers in different stages of life. Instead of fighting for employment security for 
privileged majority, the system supports security through personal development and consequently 
the improvement of employment capabilities. What is at stake in the Danish system is not the level 
of employment, which is almost as high as in Anglo Saxon economies. Security is a feature linked 
to and dependent of flexibility in the use and deployment of skills, which are in turn dependent on 
the patterns of skill formation, distribution and change. Contrary to other systems, where 
employment security leads to highly specialized workers, who develop close connections and strong 
dependence on specific firms or sectors, flexibility leads to highly skilled workers with loose 
relations to firms and sectors, and who is able to adapt to changing competitive economic regimes. 
 
The contrast seems great compared to Germany, where workers are more tied to firms in long term 
careers, making incentives for employees to invest in firm specific skills that fosters gradual 
innovation within narrow trajectories (Casper and Matraves, 2003). Probably, Denmark’s labor 
market is less able than the US labor market to foster radical innovative firm practices (Casper and 
Whitley, 2003). But it has its strength in continuous improvements, making novel products and 
probably in radically transforming people within a life span   
 
Recently the French government has tried, not successfully, to infuse more flexibility in the national 
labor market. These reforms were expected to produce a new virtuous circle of growth, creating 
more jobs and more employment. The means were quite different from the institutions, which 
prevail in the Danish labor market. The French government tried to make it more favorable for 
French employers to hire young people (who suffer a rate a 25% of unemployment) by withdrawing 
from this group the privileges that other, more old groupings holds. These reforms, had they been 
implemented, would have reduced the freedom of choice of unemployed young people, who would 
have been forced into work with reduced employment security and very low bargaining power. It is 
not a great position for cultivating the aspirations for a working career involving constantly 
changing demands for competencies and capabilities. 
 
This would not have changed the French labor market in the direction of Denmark’s. Whereas the 
French educational system is major supplier of relative firm group divisions with each their 
professional privileges and “rights” to jobs at certain, relatively well-defined hierarchical levels 
(Maurice et al., 1986; Crozier, 1964) in firms and public services, the pre-structuration of the 
Danish system of positions and roles is much more open. Traditionally this meant that Danish craft 
workers had very open possible careers, e.g. to become entrepreneurs or high level managers 
(Byrkjeflot, 2000). And they achieved this by frequent job-shifts, moving across firm boundaries 
and making use of a dense and frequently redefining further training system. 
 
Today, Danish firms are rapidly changing their work organization and redrawing hierarchical 
positions and roles. People on the other hand are moving in highly individualized ways through 
positions and training. What goes on and can go on is an experimental transformation of both firms 
and working population, so that they can both search for new market positions (as firms) and new 
professional identities (as persons). It is in this mutual redefinition process that union activists at 
local levels take on a crucial role, as they both connect people with transitory training institutions, 
and enable employers with wide possibilities to search actively for better market positions by 
offering partnership that secures the partners’ mutual benefits. 
Obviously, one of the primary tasks for Danish unions is to develop and constantly modernize the 
system that enable all different groups to engage in this continuous redefinition of professional 
identities. This is done by constantly broadening the scope of these institutions and sophisticating 
the levels and range of courses offered. In this way they might create a ladder that brings the 
majority of the population the networks of innovative cooperation that globalization offers (Unger, 
Forthcoming). 
 
A Radical perspective for Union politics in the EU 
 
Our short comparison of the French, German and Danish labor market illustrates quite well what 
could be the task for unions at a European level. If focusing on what options for self-transformation 
that the different labor markets offer their populations, unions could start suggesting reforms to the 
benefit of people as well as of the firms that try come to terms with global challenges and 
opportunities. In this process, trade unions could, drawing on OMC, use benchmarking in different 
European Countries as a way of systematically searching for inspiration for improving regional and 
national labor markets. Once some countries have demonstrated that new and different political 
actions are possible, others can also try to adapt, adopt or at least attempt to implement them.  
 In the European Employment Strategy (EES), the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) has, until 
now, been used to create schemes that favor labor market flexibility to the benefit of employers 
short term interest in being capable of easily firing workers. As it has been seen employers and 
unions may share interest in creating schemes that make workers much more skilled and attractive 
resources in helping change themselves and firms to take on increasingly advanced tasks. 
 
Thus instead of longing for and searching for ways to realize the Social Democratic vision of a 
Keynesian Social Europe, trade unions in Europe through ETUC could mobilize the EU to choose 
the “high” instead of the “low road” to labor market flexibility. 
 
As Taylor and Mathers (2004) show, the mobilization in the wake of the ETUC becoming engaged 
in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights was actually one of the most successful ones in the 
recent history of the ETUC. It is easy to imagine that rights could be formulated that would give all 
citizens access to training and mobility in different situations in such a way that it would force 
national governments to work with these issues. But it would also provide local union activists with 
the tools and the negotiating bodies that would enhance their power and usefulness towards 
employers. 
 
Furthermore, the ETUC does not need to wait for the EES OMC to take on a cross-country learning 
process on novel institutions in training and forms of work-organization that enable employee self-
transformation so that they can master increasingly difficult challenges within the frame of 
globalization. This learning process can be organized within the ETUC as an internal OMC that is 
used to provide national unions a much more direct, concrete and profound critique of national 
policies. In this way the ETUC and national unions could be actively engaged in suggesting the type 
of institutional reforms that would make enterprise partnerships favorable to workers and unions, 
and restructuring work to benefit of workers. The OMC within the ETUC could be directly used to 
discuss the comparative advantages of different subsidiaries’ labor markets within a MNC during 
EWC-meetings.  
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